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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of the 2008-2009 financial crisis on the earnings management 
behavior of Indonesian listed firms. This study gives evidence of how the presence of information 
asymmetry affects management incentives to manage earnings, especially through real activities. 
When information asymmetry is high, stakeholders do not have sufficient resources, incentives or 
access to relevant information to monitor manager’s actions, which gives rise to the practice of 
earnings management. This research replicate the work of Richardson (2000) and Rahmawati 
and Baridwan (2006) but in the setting of during global financial crisis. This study examines the 
effect of SarbOx on earnings management behavior and shows that earnings management has 
shifted from accrual management to real account management. Using 55 manufacturing firms 
from 2008 to 2011, this study adds to our knowledge of earning management and information 
asymmetry during global financial crisis in Indonesia. 
 
Key words: Earnings Management, Accrual, Real Earnings Management and Financial 
Crisis. 
 
PENGARUH ASIMETRI INFORMASI PADA MANAJEMEN LABA MELALUI 
KEGIATAN AKRUAL DAN RIIL SELAMA KRISIS KEUANGAN GLOBAL  
ABSTRAK 
Penelitian ini menganalisis dampak krisi keuangan 2008-2009 terhadap earning management 
behavior perusaahaan-perusahaan yang terdaftar. Penelitian ini memberikan bukti bagaimana 
asimetri informasi memmengaruhi management incentive untuk mengelola aktivitas riil. Jika 
asimetri informasi tinggi, stakeholder tidak memiliki sumber informasi, insentif atau akses in-
formasi yang relevan untuk memonitor tindakan manajer yang bias meningkatkan pula praktik 
earning management. Penelitian ini mereplikasi study Richardson pada 2000 dan Rahmawati 
dan Baridwan pada 2006 tetapi selama krisi keuangan global. Ini juga menganalisis pengaruh 
SarbBox pada earning management behavior dan menunjukkan bahwa earning management 
berubah dari accrual management menjadi real account management. Dengan menggunakan 
55 perusahaan manufaktur dari 2008 sampai 2011, dengan menambahkan pengetahuan earn-
ing management dan asimetri informasi selama krisi keuangan global di Indonesia. 
 
Kata Kunci: Earnings Management, Accrual, Real Earnings Management and Financial Cri-
sis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The global trade and businesses result in an 
increased flow of capital to developing 
economies in the last decade of the twentieth 
century. While capital inflows are the norms, 
the sudden outflows of such capitals cause 
financial crisis to the developing economies 
in different regions of the world. Towards 
the end of the third quarter of 2008, the 
world economy faced a new round of the 
collapse of the global economic stability, 
along with the spread of the financial crisis 
to other countries. 
The global financial crisis started to 
emerge since August 2007, when the BNP 
Paribas announced a freeze on some securi-
ties linked to risky U.S. mortgages (subprime 
mortgages). This freezing then starts trigger-
ing turmoil in financial markets and eventu-
ally spread to the whole world. At the end of 
the third quarter of 2008, the intensity of the 
crisis gained momentum as the largest bank-
ruptcy of U.S. investment bank Lehman 
Brothers, which was followed by increasingly 
severe financial difficulties in a number of 
large-scale financial institutions in the U.S., 
Europe, and Japan. The global financial crisis 
has affected the Indonesian economy as re-
flected by the turmoil in the capital markets 
and money markets. Composite Stock Price 
Index (CSPI) in December 2008 closed at 
1355.4, trimmed almost half of the level at 
the beginning of 2008 amounted to 2627.3, 
together with the fall in market capitalization 
and a sharp decline in stock trading volume. 
The financial crisis also affects the level 
of investor confidence in the company and 
also the level of confidence in the financial 
health of the creditor against a company in 
solvency. Therefore, companies try to im-
prove the performance of the company in 
order to gain the trust of investors and credi-
tors to fund the company through investments 
and loans. The importance of performance 
information measured by profits is realized 
by management. Various attempts were made 
by the management to improve the perform-
ance of the company, of the healthy ways to 
attempt to deviate (dysfunctional behavior). 
Dysfunctional behavior is realized in earnings 
management measures. Measures of earnings 
management can occur because of informa-
tion asymmetry between the principal (inves-
tors and creditors) and agents (management). 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define that earn-
ings management occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting its transac-
tions and financial statements to mislead 
change some stakeholders about the eco-
nomic performance of the company or to in-
fluence contractual outcomes that depend on 
accounting numbers reported. 
Official data (National Agency of Statis-
tics/BPS) show that the growth rate of Indo-
nesian economy was at around 4.5 percent, 
much lower than the growth rate achieved in 
2008. This may suggest that the Indonesian 
economy was also affected by the world 
economic recession in 2008/09. Gorton 
(2008) and Brunnermeier (2009) provide 
evidence about another factor explaining the 
2007-2008 financial crisis is the asymmetric 
information. Information asymmetry in this 
study focuses on its effects on earnings 
management during the crisis period. During 
the crisis, managers also have increased dis-
cretion with respect to manage reported 
earnings in the light of information asymme-
try between manager and shareholders. 
When information asymmetry is high, stake-
holders do not have sufficient resources, in-
centives or access to relevant information to 
monitor manager’s actions, which gives rise 
to the practice of earnings management 
(Schipper 1989 and Warfield et al. 1995). 
Rahmawati (2007) argues that there is a 
systematic relationship between information 
asymmetry and the level of earnings man-
agement. Management actions to manipulate 
or manage earnings can be reduced by pro-
viding quality information to outsiders 
where the quality of the financial statements 
will reflect the rate of profit. Research from 
Rahmawati and Baridwan (2006) found that 
information asymmetry has a positive and 
significant effect on earnings management. 
This research replicates the work of 
Richardson (2000) and Rahmawati and 
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Baridwan (2006) but in the setting of during 
global financial crisis. It also uses the finan-
cial crisis as an experimental setting which 
resulted in a shock to firms’ underlying 
volatility and examines the effect of infor-
mation asymmetry on earnings management. 
As in earlier work, the researcher first 
documents the presence of real and accrual 
earnings management in global financial 
crisis 2008. The SarbOxAct of 2002 ad-
dresses internal control issues of firms and 
establishes rules for auditors and manage-
ment to limit the probability of earnings 
management through accruals. In this study 
we investigate how information environment 
of a firm influence the relationship of earn-
ings management and shows that earnings 
management has shifted from accrual man-
agement to real account management 
(Cohen et al. 2008) after the passage of Sar-
bOx and global financial crisis. Using 55 
manufacturing firms from 2008 to 2011, this 
study adds to our knowledge of earning 
management and information asymmetry 
during global financial crisis in Indonesia. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS  
Information Asymmetry 
The financial statements are prepared for use 
by the various parties, including the man-
agement of the company itself. However, the 
most concerned with the actual financial 
statements are the external users. The finan-
cial statements are important to external users 
primarily because of this group are in the 
greatest condition uncertainty (Ali 2002). The 
internal users (the management) have a direct 
relationship with the entity or company and 
know the significant events that occurred. 
This situation will lead to the emergence of a 
condition referred to as asymmetric informa-
tion (information asymmetry). 
Information asymmetry is situations 
where managers have access to information 
on the company's prospects are not owned by 
outside companies. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) suggest that if the two groups (agents 
and principals) are people who are seeking to 
maximize utility, then there is good reason to 
believe that the agent will not always act in 
the best interest of the principal. Principals 
can limit by setting the right incentives for 
agents and do monitor that is designed to 
limit the aberrant activities of the agent. 
There are two types of information asymme-
try: adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Adverse selection is the type of informa-
tion asymmetry in which one or more parties 
who hold/will hold a business transaction, or 
potential business transaction has more in-
formation on the other parties. Adverse se-
lection occurs because some people like the 
manager of the company and the parties in 
(insiders) others more aware of the present 
condition and future prospects of a company 
rather than outside investors. 
Moral hazard is the type of information 
asymmetry in which one or more parties 
who hold or will hold a business transaction 
or a potential business transaction can ob-
serve their actions in the settlement of their 
transactions, while the other parties are not. 
Moral hazard can occur because of the sepa-
ration of ownership with control that is char-
acteristic of most large companies. 
The two principles of financial report-
ing—relevance and reliability, directly re-
flects the role of accounting information and 
are aimed to resolve the fundamental prob-
lem of information asymmetry. The released 
information is relevant information with re-
spect to firm’s future prospects, and is reli-
able information free of managerial manipu-
lation. Where financial disclosure and judg-
ments initially are aimed to reduce the in-
formation asymmetry between managers and 
outsiders, it has been increasingly argued 
that manager’s ability in exercising discre-
tion is likely to impose costs on the users of 
accounting information. Dye (1988) and 
Trueman & Titman (1988) point out that the 
existence of information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders is a necessary 
condition for earnings management. Schip-
per (1989) also highlights the condition for 
earnings management being the persistence 
of asymmetric information, but she relaxes 
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the condition by arguing that the blocked 
communication can be eliminated through 
the enforcement of contractual arrangement. 
Bid-ask spread is widely used as a proxy 
to measure information asymmetry (e.g. At-
tig et al. 2006). Because of the informational 
disadvantages, external shareholders will 
post a wider bid-ask spread in stock prices to 
reduce their potential losses. The wider bid-
ask spread benefits controlling shareholders 
to realize abnormal profits before the market 
adjusts its share prices to their real value, 
while external shareholders’ returns dimin-
ish and lead to losses if they adopt a buy and 
hold strategy (Demsetz 1986). Richardson 
(1998) uses the bid-ask spread and the dis-
persion in analysts’ forecasts as a measure of 
information asymmetry and finds a positive 
association between earnings management 
and the level of information asymmetry. 
 
Earnings Management 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define that earn-
ings management occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting its transac-
tions and financial statements to mislead 
change some stakeholders about the eco-
nomic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend 
on accounting numbers reported. There are 
some aspects of the discussion is contained 
in the definition. 
First, there are several ways in which 
managers can use their judgment to affect the 
financial statements. For example, a judg-
ment is necessary to estimate the numbers of 
economic events are reflected in the financial 
statements, such as the useful life and resid-
ual value of long-lived assets, losses from bad 
debts and other. The second aspect is to show 
that the goal of earnings management is to 
mislead stakeholders about the company's 
economic performance. This can happen if 
the manager does not believe that the stake-
holders can undo earnings management and 
managers have access to information not 
available to the stakeholders. Finally, man-
agement uses judgment in financial reporting 
by considering the costs and benefits. Cost is 
a potential misallocation of resources arising 
from earnings management. The benefit is the 
potential improvement in communication 
credible private information from manage-
ment to external stakeholders. 
Earnings management may arise from 
information asymmetry problem and agency 
conflicts that occur when equity ownership 
is separated from the day-to-day operation of 
the corporation and managers have a com-
parative information advantage over share-
holders. On one hand, these market imper-
fections create an environment for managers 
to engage in accounting discretion to pro-
mote their self interest at the expense share-
holders. On the other hand, they also create 
an opportunity for mangers to use account-
ing discretion to communicate their compa-
nies’ performance related information in an 
appropriate manner with investors (Trueman 
& Titman 1988; Dye 1988; Schipper 1989). 
A common characteristic of earnings 
management studies is that they investigate 
how firm's attributes (presence of bonus 
plans, earnings-based management compen-
sation or debt covenants) or a particular event 
(bond or equity issue) create incentives to 
manage earnings without taking into consid-
eration the economic environment of the 
firm. In other words, the macroeconomic 
conditions are held constant or supposed not 
to influence the incentives for earnings man-
agement. Nevertheless, there is evidence that 
macroeconomic conditions do affect earnings 
quality. Johnson (1999) for example docu-
ments that the value relevance of accounting 
earnings is sensitive to the business cycle 
more precisely that the association between 
earnings and stock returns is higher during 
expansion periods than during contraction 
years. Similarly, Jenkins et al. (2009) argue 
that since accounting information reflects 
both the consequences of general economic 
conditions and the effects of the firm's activi-
ties, its information content may vary across 
the business cycle. Contrary to Johnson 
(1999), they find that earnings are more value 
relevant during contraction years than during 
expansion periods. If macroeconomic condi-
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tions affect the information content of ac-
counting data, it can be expected that the pre-
dictive ability of accounting-based failure 
prediction models varies across the business 
cycle. Consistent with this conjecture, several 
studies report that these models are sensitive 
to the occurrence of a recession (Kane et al. 
1996; Richardson et al. 1998). 
These findings highlight the need for 
contextual earnings management studies, i.e. 
for research that would take into account the 
macroeconomic conditions in which firms 
operate. The 2008-2009 financial crisis and 
the preceding years provide a unique setting 
for such analysis. From 2004 to 2007, the 
Indonesian financial market experienced a 
moderate but continuous growth, as shown 
by IHSG whose value rose from 1.000 to 
2.750 points during this period. Following 
the subprime crisis, the index fell to less 
than 2.000 points in 2008. Since then, it re-
covered a part of its decline but without ex-
ceeding the 3.000 points threshold. 
 
Financial Crisis 
The 2008-2009 financial crisis and the pre-
ceding years provide a unique setting for 
indication of earnings management analysis. 
The financial crisis had significant conse-
quences on the level of economic activity. 
From the early 70’s to 2008, the world ex-
perienced an uninterrupted period of eco-
nomic growth with continuously positive 
GDP growth rates. In 2009, the gross do-
mestic product declined for the first time in 
40 years. 
Indonesia is a small open economy so the 
impact of the global financial crisis greatly 
affected the domestic economy. In Indonesia, 
the impact of the crisis began to be felt espe-
cially towards the end of 2008. After record 
growth of over 6% up to the third quarter of 
2008, Indonesia's economy started to get 
heavy pressure in the fourth quarter of 2008. 
This was reflected in a significant economic 
slowdown is mainly due to falling exports. 
Externally, Indonesia's balance of payments 
deficit and increased exchange rate weakened 
significantly. In financial markets, risk differ-
ence (risk spread) of the securities Indonesia 
experienced a significant increase which en-
courages capital outflow of foreign invest-
ment in the stock market, government securi-
ties (GS), and Bank Indonesia Certificates 
(SBI). In relative terms, Indonesia's overall 
position is not as precarious as other coun-
tries. Indonesia's economy was growth by 
6.1% in 2008. Meanwhile, the fundamental 
condition of the external sector, fiscal and 
banking industry is also strong enough to 
withstand the storm of global crises. 
 
Earnings Management around Financial 
Crisis 
In the period of crisis, most firms probably 
exhibit lower earnings, which should moti-
vate managers to engage in income-
increasing earnings management to compen-
sate for the decrease of operational perform-
ance (Ahmad-Zaluki et al. 2011). Managers 
of the most affected firms in particular may 
manipulate earnings upward to avoid a large 
decline of the firm's stock price that would 
negatively impact their compensation 
(Charitou et al. 2007). 
Another reason for the company to man-
age earnings in the crisis period is the pres-
ence of debt covenants. Since such cove-
nants are partially based on earnings (Dichev 
and Skinner 2002), income-increasing ma-
nipulations should reduce the probability of 
violations (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; 
Sweeney 1994; Saleh and Ahmed 2005; Iat-
ridis and Kadorinis 2009). 
Consistent with the intuition that periods 
of economic turbulence incite managers to 
manipulate earnings upward, Ahmad-Zaluki 
et al. (2011) report that income-increasing 
earnings management by Malaysian firms 
engaged in initial public offerings was limited 
to IPOs that occurred during the Asian crisis 
period (1997-1998). In troubled periods, 
managers of financially distressed firms may 
also have incentives to manage earnings 
downward. Firms that violate debt covenants 
or miss a debt repayment must undertake debt 
restructuring. For these firms, reporting losses 
may help obtain concessions from lenders. 
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Banks have the option to refuse these 
concessions and require the firm's liquida-
tion. However, in recession periods the real-
izable value of firm's assets is probably low 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1992), which should 
incite them to accept conditions that they 
would ordinarily refuse. Consistent with this 
intuition, Asquith et al. (1994) provide evi-
dence that rather than exercising their right 
to call the loan, banks generally prefer to 
restructure the debt by waiving covenants, 
delaying principal and interest, or reducing 
the interest rate. 
Income-reducing earnings management 
may also result from agency relationships 
with employees. DeAngelo et al. (1994) for 
example note that by reporting losses, man-
agers portray the firm as seriously troubled, 
which may be useful to extract concessions 
from employees who otherwise would doubt 
the existence and persistence of the firm's 
difficulties. In support of this assertion, 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991) show that 
reported earnings are lower during union 
renegotiations. 
The search for political advantages may 
also motivate the reduction of earnings. In 
crisis periods, governments are likely to pro-
vide support to firms in financial distress 
(Peltzman 1976). Governmental support may 
take various forms. Ahmed et al. (2008) men-
tion that during the Asian financial crisis, the 
Malaysian government instituted mechanisms 
to facilitate the debt restructuring of compa-
nies. In 2008-2009, governments of many 
countries provided banks with public funds in 
order to mitigate the credit crisis. 
Firms may also use the economic down-
turn as a pretext to obtain advantages or op-
pose new regulations. Because the probabil-
ity of obtaining governmental aid increases 
as financial performance worsens, firms 
have an incentive to deflate earnings. The 
literature provides evidence of income-
reducing earnings management to obtain 
advantages from the government (Jones 
1991; Lim and Matolcsy 1999; Navissi 
1999). In an analysis of accounting choices 
of troubled companies, DeAngelo et al. 
(1994) report that several distressed firms 
used their financial difficulties to argue for 
import relief or antitrust clearance. Thus, the 
following hypothesis can be formulated: 
H1: Earnings management during the finan-
cial crisis tends to be lower than the earnings 
management after financial crisis. 
 
The Effect of Information Asymmetry on 
Earnings Management during Financial 
Crisis 
The overriding opinion expressed by aca-
demics and regulators in the aftermath of the 
most severe financial crisis since the Great 
Depression has been that financial reporting 
failed in providing transparent and timely 
information. Investor confidence was low 
during the economic crisis and share market 
liquidity was poor. If firms’ financial report-
ing were inadequate or there is information 
asymmetry, that would further decrease the 
confidence of investors. 
Some researchers have found that infor-
mation asymmetry can affect earnings man-
agement. Agency theory implies the exis-
tence of information asymmetry between 
managers as agents and owners (in this case 
is a shareholder) as principal. Information 
asymmetry arises when managers are more 
aware of internal information and the com-
pany's prospects in the future compared to 
shareholders and other stakeholders. If asso-
ciated with an increase in the value of the 
company, when there is asymmetry of infor-
mation, managers can provide a signal about 
the state of the company to investors in order 
to maximize the value of company stock. 
Given signal can be done through disclosure 
(disclosure) of accounting information. 
Some firms might just have suffered 
temporarily financial trouble. So manage-
ment would use income decreasing earnings 
management and give a clear signal to the 
market of their underlying economic per-
formance. When information asymmetry is 
high, stakeholders do not have sufficient 
resources, incentives, or access to relevant 
information to monitor’s actions, and thus 
gives rise to practice of earnings manage-
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ment (Schipper 1989; Warfield et al. 1995). 
The literature has suggested that the effect of 
earnings management is related with a firm’s 
information characteristics. Because share-
holders lack sufficient resources, incentives 
or access to relevant information, it is often 
difficult for them to have an effective moni-
toring on manager’s actions (Schipper 1989 
and Warfield, et al. 1995). 
Analytical models have demonstrated 
that the existence of information asymmetry 
between firm management and shareholders 
is a necessary condition for the practice of 
earnings management (Dye 1988, Trueman 
and Titman 1988, and Chaney and Lewis 
1995). In addition, Richardson (2000) present 
some empirical evidence that the greater the 
information asymmetry between management 
and shareholders, the more likely the firms 
are to manage accruals and earnings. Finally, 
Frankel and Li (2004) find that the profit of 
insider trading is strongly related with charac-
teristics of firms’ information environment. 
Insiders have larger gains when the degree of 
information asymmetry is greater. Thus, the 
effectiveness of earnings management to mis-
lead investors may depend on the information 
environment of the firm. Thus, the following 
hypothesis can be formulated: 
H2: The higher information asymmetry, the 
higher the earnings management during the 
period of financial crisis. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Data, Population, and Sample 
This study uses secondary data from the In-
donesia Stock Exchange data centers: Public 
Companies in the Financial Statement of 
Master of Science and Doctoral Program 
Faculty of Economics, University of Gadjah 
Mada, IDX database is available at the Cen-
ter for Development of Accounting UGM, 
and in www.idx.co.id. Sampling was con-
ducted using purposive sampling method 
which is the method of sample by using the 
following criteria: 
1. Listed on the Stock Exchange and publish 
audited financial statements are consistent 
and complete from the year 2008-2011. 
2. Types of sample firms are manufacturing 
firms. Reason took a manufacturing 
company, because according to Na'im 
and Hartono (1996) model of accruals is 
not suitable for non-manufacturing com-
panies. Another reason is to obtain the 
characteristics of the same company. 
3. Company does not undertake acquisi-
tions or mergers. 
4. Financial reporting currency is Indonesia 
Rupiah. 
5. Have complete data, whether the data 
needed to calculate information asymme-
try, and earnings management. 
6. Stock price data is available for estima-
tion and observation period 
Samples were selected based research 
used purposive sampling method which es-
tablishes a number of sampling criteria de-
scribed above. Based on the criteria de-
scribed, obtained 220 total samples of ob-
servational data consist of 55 samples of the 
company for a period of four years. After 
testing the quality of the data, then a total of 
37 observations were found to be outliers of 
data that must be removed to meet the clas-
sical assumption test performed. Therefore, 
from the screening data is the only remain-
ing 183 observations are worthy to be tested 
(see Table 1). 
 
Research Variables and Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
Earnings Management through Accrual 
Manipulation 
Earnings management as the dependent 
variable proxied by discretionary accruals 
and is calculated by the Modified Jones 
Model. The reason for choosing this modi-
fied Jones models because the model is re-
garded as the best model in detecting earn-
ings management compared to other models 
and provide the most robust results (Dechow 
et al. 1995). The steps in calculating discre-
tionary accruals as follows: 
TA (total accrual) = Net income – Cash flow 
from operation (1) 
Tat/At-1=α1 (1/At-1) + α2 (ΔREVt/At-1) + 
α3 (PPEt/At-1) + ε, (2) 
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where: 
At-1 = Total asset in period t-1 
ΔREVt = changing in revenues for period t 
PPEt =  Property, Plan, and Equipment 
α1, α2, α3 = Regression coefficients 
NDA =α1 (1/At-1) + α2 (ΔREVt-ΔRECt)/At-
1) + α3 (PPEt/At-1) (3) 
where: 
ΔRECt = changing in net receivables for 
period t 
Furthermore, the value of discretionary 
accruals can be calculated as follows: 
DACit = TAt /At-1-NDA (4) 
where: 
DACit = Discretionary accruals for period t 
NDA = Non discretionary accruals 
 
Earnings Management through Real Ac-
tivities 
This study relies on prior studies that devel-
oped proxies for real earnings management. 
Cohen et al. (2008) base their measures of 
real earnings management on Roychowd-
hury (2006) and others. Specifically, they 
focus on three manipulation methods that 
would increase bottom-line earnings: 
1. acceleration of the timing of sales through 
increased price discounts or more lenient 
credit terms, which would abnormally de-
crease cash from operations; 
2. reporting lower cost of goods sold 
through increased production; and 
3. decreasing in discretionary expenses in-
cluding advertising expense, research and 
development expenses, and selling, gen-
eral, and administrative (SG&A) ex-
penses. 
The discretionary or abnormal levels of 
the above real accounts are measured as fol-
lows: 
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + α1(1/At-1) + β1(St/At-1) + 
β2(∆St/At-1) + єt (4) 
PRODt/At-1 = α0 + α1(1/At-1) + β1(St/At-1) + 
β2(∆St/At-1) + β3(∆St-1/At-1) + єt (5) 
DISEXPt/At-1 = α0 + α1(1/At-1) + β(St-1/At-1) 
+ єt (6) 
where CFOt is cash from operations in pe-
riod t, PRODt is production costs in period t, 
defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and 
the change in inventory in period t, and 
DEXPt is discretionary expenses, defined as 
the sum of advertising expenses, R&D ex-
penses and SG&A. The abnormal cash from 
operations (ACFOt), abnormal production 
costs (APRODt), and abnormal discretionary 
expenses (ADEXPt) are the residuals from 
the above regressions. 
ACFOt = CFOt - CFOt/At-1 (7) 
APRODt = PRODt - PRODt/At-1 (8) 
ADEXPt = DISEXPt - DISEXPt/At-1 (9) 
The regressions are run separately for 
each company and for each year. A negative 
ACFOt and ADEXPt as well as a positive 
APRODt would indicate income-increasing 
earnings management. 
 
Independent Variables 
This study uses bid-ask spreads (SPREAD) 
Table 1 
Purposive Sampling Results  
 
No Description Total 
1 Manufacturing companies that are listed consecutively on the Stock 
Exchange during the period 2008 through 2011 
120
2 The Company does not have complete information on the data report 
available financial consecutively during the study period 
(27)
4 Companies that publish financial statements in foreign currency (11)
5 Companies that do not have complete information about the data 
earnings management and  
(4)
6 The Company does not have complete data on daily stock prices 
for the independent variable asymmetry of information 
(20)
7 Companies that make acquisitions. (3)
 Total sample 55
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as measure of information asymmetry. Fol-
lowing Amihud and Mendelson (1986), this 
study define SPREAD as the relative bid-ask 
spread using daily closing bids and asks. The 
formula for SPREAD as follows: 
SPREADi,t = (ASKi,t – BIDi,t)/ (ASKi,t + 
BIDi,t)/2 x 100 (10) 
Model to adjust the spread is: 
SPREADi,t = α0 + α1PRICEi,t + α2VARi,t + 
α3TRANSi,t + α4DEPTHi,t + 
α5ADJSPREADi,t (11) 
Where PRICEi,t is ask price (bid), the 
highest shares of firm i on day t, VARi,t is 
variance of daily returns over the study pe-
riod in the company's stock i and day t, 
TRANSi,t is the number of transactions of a 
company's stock i on day t, DEPTHi,t is av-
erage number of shares of company i in all 
quotes, ADJSPREADi,t is residual error is 
used as a measure SPREAD adjusted for 
firm i on day t. 
 
Control Variable 
Following prior research, this study includes 
the company size, because larger firms have 
less information asymmetry (Atiase 1985, 
Bamber 1987). Firm size is a scale in which 
the size of the company can be classified 
according to a variety of ways, including: 
log of total assets (Marihot and Doddy 
2007), the log of total sales (Nuryaman 
2008), market capitalization (Halim et al. 
2005). Firm size in this study uses a proxy 
total year-end asset (Ln TA). 
 
Method of Data Analysis 
Analysis of the data used to test the hypothe-
sis 2 in this study was to use multiple regres-
sion models with the following equation: 
DAi,t = α0 + α1 ADJSPREADi,t + α2 UPt i,t + 
ei,t (12) 
ACFOi,t = α0 + α1 ADJSPREADi,t + α2 UPt i,t 
+ ei,t (13) 
APRODi,t = α0 + α1 ADJSPREADi,t + α2 UPt 
i,t + ei,t (14) 
ADEXPi,t = α0 + α1 ADJSPREADi,t + α2 UPt 
i,t + ei,t (15) 
Since the three separate real account 
manipulation measures have different effects 
on bottom-line earnings, this study do not 
make predictions about the sum of real earn-
ings management (AREAL = ACFOi,t + 
APRODi,t + ADEXPi,t). 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for all 
of the variables comprising the mean, stan-
dard deviation, minimum and maximum val-
ues. Earnings management is proxied by dis-
cretionary Accrual shows the average discre-
tionary accruals amounting to -0.0507 which 
indicates decreasing discretionary accruals. 
ACFO, APROD, and ADEXP as a proxy for 
real earnings management suggests manipu-
lation methods that will improve the bottom 
line. This is consistent with Roychowdury 
(2006) and Cohen et al. (2008). 
 
Results 
Earnings Management During and Post 
Financial Crisis 
Hypothesis testing is first done by paired 
sample T-test to show whether there are dif-
ferences in discretionary accruals between 
during crisis and post-crisis. Table 3 shows 
the results of testing of discretionary accru-
als between during crisis to post-crisis with a 
significance level of 5% is produced sig. (2-
tailed) of 0.516. Significance values above 
5% (0.000 <0.05), the test results showed no 
difference in DA. It can be explained that 
DA is not significantly different during crisis 
and post crisis period, indicating that man-
agement engage in less accrual manipulation 
following the passage of SarbOx (Ibrahim et 
al. 2011). In crisis period, firms are subject 
to increased monitoring from auditors, credi-
tors and other stakeholders, which should 
result in managers having less discretion to 
manage earnings (Chia et al. 2007) 
Table 3 shows the results of testing of 
ACFO between during crisis and post-crisis 
with a significance level of 5% is produced 
sig. (2-tailed) of 0.000. Significance values 
far below 5% (0.000 <0.05), the test results 
showed a highly significant value 
Table 3 shows the results of testing of 
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APROD between during crisis and post-
crisis with a significance level of 5% is pro-
duced sig. (2-tailed) of 0.000. Significance 
values far below 5% (0.000 <0.05), the test 
results showed a highly significant value. 
Table 3 shows the results of testing of 
ADEXP between during crisis to post-crisis 
with a significance level of 5% are produced 
sig. (2-tailed) of 0.000. Significance values 
far below 5% (0.000 <0.05), the test results 
showed a highly significant value. 
From the test results with the paired t-
test showed that there is a difference be-
tween real earnings management during the 
crisis and after the crisis. Contraction peri-
ods should thus be associated with less earn-
ings management and, consequently more 
conservative (i.e. more timely) earnings 
(Jenkins et al. 2009). empirical evidence 
from the 1997 Asian financial crisis and 
earnings management studies provide some 
evidence that managers engaged in more 
income-decreasing earnings management 
during the crisis period (Saleh and Ahmed 
2005; Ahmed, Godfrey, and Saleh 2008). 
Hypothesis 1 is supported and con-
firmed. Jenkins et al. (2009) that the search 
for political advantages may also motivate 
the reduction of earnings. Because the prob-
ability of obtaining governmental aid in-
creases as financial performance worsens, 
firms have an incentive to deflate earnings. 
Empirical evidence from the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis and earnings management 
studies provide some evidence that manag-
ers engaged in more income-decreasing 
earnings management during the crisis pe-
riod (Saleh and Ahmed 2005; Ahmed, God-
frey, and Saleh 2008). 
The Effect of Information Asymmetry on 
Earnings Management during Financial 
Crisis 
Table 4 presents the OLS parameter esti-
mates with the level of significance for all 
regression models (models 1, 2, 3, and 4). 
Information asymmetry in model 1 does not 
affect the accrual of earnings management 
during the crisis period (tstat = 1.061, p> 
0.05). This indicates that after a period of 
crisis in 1998 and a decline in the use of 
Sarbox earnings manipulation using the ac-
crual method of accounting. Li et al. (2008) 
show that accrual earnings management has 
declined following the passage of Sarbox. 
Decrease the use of the accrual basis of 
lower income keinformativan thus reducing 
information asymmetry. Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980), Verrecchia (1982 2001), 
Diamond (1985), Baiman and Verrecchia 
(1996), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) give 
evidence that the level of information 
asymmetry is inversely related to the infor-
mativeness of public information. In terms 
of litigation, earnings management through 
revenue misstatement increases the likeli-
hood of litigation; roommates are consistent 
with Palmrose et al. (2004) who demonstrate 
a positive relationship between litigation and 
misstatement of revenue after 1998 crisis. 
As a result, investors will be misled by the 
information accrual earnings management.  
Model 2 shows that the information 
asymmetry significantly affects earnings 
management through real activities (operat-
ing cash flow). These results are consistent 
with previous studies in which Oktorina 
(2008) and Sahabu (2009) provide evidence 
that firms in the asymmetry information try 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
DA 183 -0.5545 0.6601 -0.0507 0.1652 
ACFO 183 -2.9304 1.9830 -0.2115 0.5446 
APROD 183 -50.2246 20.2760 2.0157 5.4259 
ADEXP 183 -3.1223 1.6681 -0.0502 0.5416 
ADJSPREAD 183 0.0005 5.7182 1.1168 1.6922 
UP 183 24.5621 29.9764 27.5120 1.1289 
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to manipulate earnings through real activi-
ties by using cash flow operations. Gunny 
(2005) also showed that real earnings man-
agement is very significantly related to earn-
ings and future cash flows are low. Model 3 
indicates that when there is asymmetry in-
formation, firms are also doing real activities 
manipulation through production costs. Ac-
cording to Roychowdhury (2006), compa-
nies doing real activities manipulation of 
earnings through cost of production tend to 
show unusually high production cost. Model 
4 shows that the information asymmetry sig-
nificantly affects real earnings management 
through real discretionary costs. These re-
sults are consistent with previous studies in 
which Roychowdhury (2006), Sari (2008), 
and Andayani (2008) have demonstrated the 
existence of real earnings management prac-
tices for discretionary expenses, are gener-
ally recorded when the costs are incurred. 
Sari (2008) states that in an economy 
with a high level of investor protection (such 
as during the crisis), the manager prefers to 
do the manipulation of earnings manage-
ment through real activities than through 
accruals manipulation. Although the econ-
omy with a high level of investor protection, 
the manager still has a higher discretionary 
earnings management through real activities 
manipulation than accruals. Income can be 
manipulated upwards through real accounts 
by cutting real expenditures, reducing cost 
of goods sold by increasing production, or 
increasing sales through offering lenient 
terms and discounts to customers, which 
would reduce operating cash flows. 
Information asymmetry coefficients 
measured by ADJSPREAD has a positive 
value for the model. The higher the differ-
ence between the bid-ask spread then the 
higher the information asymmetry. The 
higher asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders can lead to earnings manage-
ment primarily through real activities during 
the crisis. This result is consistent with 
Frankel and Li (2004) that the profit of in-
sider trading is strongly related with charac-
teristics of firms’ information environment. 
Insiders have larger gains when the degree 
of information asymmetry is greater. Hy-
pothesis 2 is supported. 
 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUG-
GESTION, AND LIMITATIONS 
This study examines the effect of information 
asymmetry on earnings management during 
the recent financial crisis. This study first 
examine earnings management around finan-
cial crisis and find that earnings management 
lower significantly during the crisis, espe-
cially for real earnings management. There is 
no evident for accrual earnings management 
in this research. These results suggest that the 
SarbOx Act of 2002 was designed to reduce 
earnings management and become more in-
tensive to reduce earnings management, spe-
cifically through accrual accounts. 
This study gives evidence of how the 
presence of information asymmetry affects 
management incentives to manage earnings, 
especially through real activities. The level 
of earnings management increases as the 
level of information asymmetry increases. 
When information asymmetry is high, stake-
holders may not have the necessary informa-
tion to undo manipulated earnings. Another 
possible explanation is that the existence of 
firms with high levels of information asym-
metry is evidence of shareholders without 
sufficient resources, incentives, or access to 
relevant information to manager’s action, 
Table 3 
DA, ACFO, APROD,  ADEXP During and Post-Crisis 
 
Variables t-statistics Prob. (2-tailed) Description 
DA 0.657 0.516** No difference in DA 
ACFO 5.186 0.000** Difference in ACFO 
APROD 4.325 0.000** Difference in APROD 
ADEXP 1.090 0.000** Difference in ADEXP 
** Significant at level α=5%. 
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which may give rise to the practice of earn-
ings management. 
Some limitations of the study include 
generalizeability and methodology issues. 
Specifically, this study focuses on a very 
specific setting, global financial crisis in 
2008. The conclusions of the study may not 
be generalizeable to other settings. This is an 
avenue for future research. Furthermore, the 
post global financial crisis period is small 
due to data limitations which may impact the 
results. Finally, as in all earnings manage-
ment studies, the manipulation measures 
may not fully capture the magnitude and 
nature of manipulation. 
 
REFERENCES 
Ahmad-Zaluki, NA, K Campbell, and A Goo-
dacre, 2011, ‘Earnings management in 
Malaysian IPOs: The East Asian crisis, 
ownership control, and post-IPO per-
formance’, The International Journal of 
Accounting, 46, pp. 111-137. 
Ahmed, K, JM Godfrey, and NM Saleh, 
2008, ‘Market perceptions of discre-
tionary accruals by debt renegotiating 
during economic downturn’, The In-
ternational Journal of Accounting, 43, 
pp. 114-138. 
Ali Irfan, 2002, ‘Pelaporan Keuangan dan 
Asimetri Informasi dalam Hubungan 
Agensi’, Lintasan Ekonomi, Vol. XIX, 
No. 2, July 2002. 
Asquith, P, R Gertner, and D Scharfstein, 
1994, ‘Anatomy of financial distress: 
An examination of junk-bond issuers’, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
109, pp. 625-658. 
Atiase, R 1985, ‘Predisclosure Information, 
Firm Capitalization, and Security Price 
Behavior Earnings Announcements’, 
Journal of Accounting Research, 23: 
21–36. 
Attig, N, Gadhoum, Y, & Lang, L 2006, ‘Ef-
fects of Large Shareholding on Infor-
mation Asymmetry and Stock Liquid-
ity’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 
30, 2875-2892. 
Baiman, S, and R Verrecchia, 1996, ‘The 
Relation among Capital Markets, Fi-
nancial Disclosure, Production Effi-
ciency, and Insider Trading’, Journal 
of Accounting Research, 34: 1–22. 
Bamber, LS 1987, ‘Unexpected Earnings, 
Firm Size, and Trading Volume around 
Quarterly Earnings Announcements’, 
Accounting Review, 62: 510–532. 
Chaney, P, and C Lewis, 1995, ‘Earnings 
management and firm valuation under 
asymmetric information’, Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 1: 319-345. 
Charitou, A, N Lambertides, and L Trigeor-
gis, 2007, ‘Earnings behaviour of fi-
nancially distressed firms: The role of 
institutional ownership, Abacus, 43, 
pp. 271-296. 
Table 4 
Regression Results 
 
Variable Coeff. Std. Error t-stat Prob. Adj. R
2 F-stat. 
(Prob.) 
Model 1: DAi.t = α0 + α1 ADJSPREADi.t + α2 UPt i.t + ei.t 
 ADJSPREAD 2.573 2.425 1.061 0.292
 UP 0.005 0.002 2.578 0.011
0.093 3.687
 (0.000)
Model 2: ACFOi.t = α0 + α1 ADJSPREADi.t + α2 UPt i.t + ei.t 
 ADJSPREAD 0.192 0.073 2.645 0.009
 UP -0.049 0.013 -3.770 0.000
0. 148 5.078
(0.000)
Model 3: APRODi.t = α0 + α1 ADJSPREADi.t + α2 UPt i.t + ei.t 
 ADJSPREAD 0.505 0.371 1.363 0.176
 UP -0.598 1.101 -0.543 0.589
0.231 9.462
(0.000)
Model 4: ADEXPi.t = α0 + α1 ADJSPREADi.t + α2 UPt i.t + ei.t 
 ADJSPREAD 0.688 0.499 1.378 0.171
 UP -4.044 1.483 -2.728 0.007
0.129 4.216
(0.000)
Journal of Economics, Business, and Accountancy Ventura Volume 16, No. 2, August 2013, pages 325 – 338 
Accreditation No. 80/DIKTI/Kep/2012 
337 
Chia, YM, I Lapsley, and HW Lee, 2007, 
‘Choice of auditors and earnings man-
agement during the Asian financial cri-
sis’, Managerial Auditing Journal, 22, 
pp. 177-196. 
Cohen, DA, Dey, A, and Lys, T 2008, ‘Real 
and accrual-based earnings manage-
ment in the pre- and post-Sarbanes 
Oxley periods’, The Accounting Re-
view, Vol. 83, May, pp. 757-88. 
DeAngelo, H, and L DeAngelo, 1991, ‘Un-
ion negotiations and corporate policy’, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 30, 
pp. 3-43. 
DeAngelo, H, L DeAngelo, and DJ Skinner, 
1994, ‘Accounting choice in troubled-
companies’, Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 17, pp. 113-143. 
Dechow, PM, RG Sloan, and AP Sweeney, 
1995, ‘Detecting earnings manage-
ment’, The Accounting Review, 70, pp. 
193-225. 
DeFond, ML, and J Jiambalvo, 1994, ‘Debt 
covenant violation and manipulation 
of accruals’, Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 17, pp. 145-176. 
Demsetz, H, 1968, ‘The cost of transacting’, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 82, No. 1, pp: 33-53. 
Diamond, DW 1985, ‘Optimal release of 
information by firms’, Journal of Fi-
nance, 40 (4), pp. 1071-1094. 
Dichev, ID, and DJ Skinner, 2002, ‘Large-
sample evidence on the debt covenant 
hypothesis’, Journal of Accounting 
Research, 40, pp. 1091-1123. 
Dye, R 1988, ‘Earnings Management in An 
overlapping Generations Model’, 
Journal of Accounting Research: 195–
235. 
Frankel, R and Li, X 2004, ‘Characteristics 
of a firm’s information environment 
and the information asymmetry be-
tween insiders and outsiders’, Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 37, 
229-259. 
Grossman, SJ, Stiglitz, JE, 1980, ‘On the 
impossibility of informationally effi-
cient markets’, The American Eco-
nomic Review, 70 (3), 393-408. 
Halim, J, Meiden, C and Tobing, RL 2005, 
‘Pengaruh Manajemen Laba Pada 
Tingkat Pengungkapan Laporan 
Keuangan Pada Perusahaan Manufak-
tur Yang Termasuk Dalam Indeks LQ-
45’, Simposium Nasional Akuntansi 
VIII, Solo, 15–16 September. 
Healy, P, K Palepu, 1999, ‘Discussion of 
Earnings – Based Bonus Plans and 
Earnings Management by Business 
Unit Managers’, Journal of Account-
ing and Economics, 26, 143 – 147. 
Iatridis, G, and G Kadorinis, 2009, ‘Earnings 
management and firm financial mo-
tives: A financial investigation of UK 
listed firms’, International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 18, pp. 164-173. 
Ibrahim, S, Xu, L, and Rogers, G 2011, 
‘Real and accrual-based earnings man-
agement and its legal consequences: 
Evidence from seasoned equity offer-
ings’, Accounting Research Journal, 
24 (1), 50-78. 
Jenkins, DS, GD Kane, and U Velury, 2009, 
‘Earnings conservatism and value rele-
vance across the business cycle’, Jour-
nal of Business Finance and Account-
ing, 36, pp. 1041-1058 
Jensen, MC, and Meckling, WH 1976, ‘The 
Theory of The Firm: Managerial Be-
haviour, Agency Cost and Ownership 
Structure’, Journal of Financial and 
Economic, Vol. 3, pp. 305-360. 
Johnson, NS 1999, Current SEC develop-
ments—’Managed earnings’ and ‘The 
year of the accountant’, Remarks de-
livered at the Utah State Bar Mid-Year 
Convention, St. George, 
UT.March6.Available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speec
harchive/1999/spch264.htm. 
Jones, JJ 1991, ‘Earnings management dur-
ing import relief investigations’, Jour-
nal of Accounting Research, 29 (Au-
tumn): 193–228. 
Kane, GD, FM Richarson, and P Graybeal, 
1996, ‘Recession-induced stress and 
the prediction of corporate failure’, 
ISSN 2087-3735 The Effect of Information … (Lodovicus Lasdi) 
338 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 
13, pp. 631-650. 
Leuz, Christian, and Robert E Verrecchia, 
2000, ‘The Economic Consequences 
of Increased Disclosure’, Journal of 
Accounting Research, 38, 91-124. 
Li, H, Pincus, M, and Rego, SO 2008, ‘Mar-
ket reaction to events surrounding the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and earn-
ings management’, The Journal of 
Law & Economics, Vol. 51, pp. 111-
34. 
Lim, S, and Matolcsy, Z 1999, ‘Earnings 
management of firms subjected to 
product price controls’, Accounting 
and Finance, 39, 131-150. 
Marihot, N, and S Doddy, 2007, ‘Pengaruh 
Corporate Governance terhadap Mana-
jemen Laba di Industri Perbankan In-
donesia’, SNA X Makassar. 
Navissi, F 1999, ‘Earnings management un-
der price regulation’, Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 16, pp. 281-304. 
Nuryaman, 2008, ‘Pengaruh Konsentrasi 
Kepemilikan, Ukuran Perusahaan, dan 
Mekanisme Corporate Governance 
terhadap Manajemen Laba’, Simpo-
sium Nasional Akuntansi XI. 
Palmrose, Z, Richardson, V, and Scholz, S 
2004, ‘Determinants of market reac-
tions to restatement announcements’, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
Vol. 37, pp. 59-89. 
Peltzman, S 1976, ‘Toward a more general 
theory of regulation’, The Journal of 
Law and Economics, 19, pp. 211-240. 
Rahmawati, and Zaki Baridwan, 2006, ‘Pen-
garuh Asimetri Informasi, Regulasi, 
Perbankan dan Ukuran Perusahaan 
Pada Manajemen Laba Dengan Model 
Akrual Khusus Perbankan (Studi Em-
piris Pada Industri Perbankan di Indo-
nesia yang Terdaftar di BEJ)’. Jurnal 
Akuntasi dan Bisnis Indonesia, Vol. 6 
No. 2, August: 139-150. 
Richardson, FM, GD Kane, and P Lobingier, 
1998, ‘The impact of recession on the 
prediction of corporate failure’, Jour-
nal of Business Finance and Account-
ing, 25, pp. 167-186. 
Richardson, V 2000, ‘Information asymme-
try and earnings management: Some 
evidence’, Review of Quantitative Fi-
nance and Accounting, 15, 325-347. 
Roychowdhury, S 2006, ‘Earnings Man-
agement through Real Activities Ma-
nipulation’, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 42: 335-370. 
Saleh, NM, and K Ahmed, 2005, ‘Earnings 
management of distressed firms during 
debt renegotiation’, Accounting and 
Business Research, 35, pp. 69-86. 
Sari, Ratna Candra. 2008, ‘Investor Protec-
tion, Real Activity Manipulation And 
Accrual Manipulation: Asian Com-
parison’, The 2nd Accounting Confer-
ence, 1st Doctoral Colloquium, and 
Accounting Workshop, Depok, 4-5 
November. 
Schipper, K, 1989, ‘Commentary on earn-
ings management’, Accounting Hori-
zons, 3, 91-102. 
Shleifer, A, and R Vishny, 1992, ‘Liquida-
tion values and debt capacity: A mar-
ket equilibrium approach’, Journal of 
Finance, 47, pp. 1343-1366. 
Sweeney, A 1994, ‘Debt covenant violations 
and managers' accounting responses’, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
17, 281-308. 
Trueman, B, and Titman, S 1988, ‘An ex-
planation for accounting income 
smoothing’, Journal of Accounting Re-
search, 26, Supplement, 127-139. 
Verrecchia, RE 2001, ‘Essays on disclo-
sure’, Journal of Accounting & Eco-
nomics, 32: 97–108. 
Verrecchia, RE 1982, ‘The Use of Mathe-
matical Models in Financial Account-
ing’, Journal of Accounting Research, 
20: 1–42. 
Warfield, T, Wild, J, and Wild, K 1995, 
‘Managerial ownership, accounting 
choices, and in formativeness of earn-
ings’, Journal of Accounting and Eco-
nomics, 20, 61-91. 
  
